University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1992

Representation of numerical information : exploration of the
category structure of distributions of numerical stimuli.
Robert Kevin Stone
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Stone, Robert Kevin, "Representation of numerical information : exploration of the category structure of
distributions of numerical stimuli." (1992). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 3748.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/3748

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

REPRESENTATION OF NUMERICAL INFORMATION:
EXPLORATION OF THE CATEGORY STRUCTURE OF

DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMERICAL STIMULI

A Dissertation Presented
by

ROBERT KEVIN STONE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1992

Department of Psychology

Copyright by Robert Kevin Stone 1992
All Rights Reserved

REPRESENTATION OF NUMERICAL INFORMATION:
EXPLORATION OF THE CATEGORY STRUCTURE OF
DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMERICAL STIMULI

A dissertation presented
by

ROBERT KEVIN STONE

Approved as to style and content by;

nold D. Well, Chairperson of Committee

Ja^ee

I.

Chumbley, Membe

ian L. MacDbhald// Member

Thomas Kida, Member

Charles E. Clifton, Department Chair
Department of Psychology

DEDICATION

This dissertation
faith

in my

is

dedicated to the person who had

abilities when my faith

person who kept me (marginally)

in

myself waned,

the

sane throughout my graduate

school career, the person who put up with the stress of living
in the midst of a dissertation zone,

and who,

for the seven

years that this endeavor took, kept the wolf from the door. As
the song says:
Bear.

"This is dedicated to the one

I

love."

To

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

wish to thank all of the people who have made this

I

possibility.

First

and

foremost,

want

I

to

express

a

my

admiration for and gratitude to Arnie Well and Jim Chumbley,
who as a team have seen me through five years of graduate
school.

Between them,

course,

with humor

they guided me on an often unsteady

and

advice,

and

occasional

an

threat,

towards an understanding of science and of my part therein.

Thanks to the friends I've made along the way for their
help and understanding.

I

would especially like to thank Celia

Klin, Ted Trobaugh, and Rene Schmauder for Tuesday nights: for

their floors and couches,

which made

and for tea and talk,

living far from school a more acceptable choice. Also, thanks
to everyone else who participated in Tuesday night pre-seminar

dinners

for

laughter

and

comraderie.

This

is

a

wonderful

tradition which remains long after the seminar talks have
faded. Keep it up.
I

also owe a great debt to Tania Theberge, my research

assistant, who was responsible for my lab at UMASS, and who

was invaluable throughout this process.

She kept it and me

running through five of three experiments.
My thanks to those who went before: To Chris Young, Robin
Morris,

Susan Boyce, and Harry Blanchard for their guidance

and their wisdom as well as their friendship.
V

wish to thank Donna Vivieros

I

guide, and a good friend. Without her,

for
I

being a model,

a

would have probably

never discovered the excitement of scholarship or survived the

dark times.
To Keene State College, and particularly Gordon

Leversee, go my thanks for all of the assistance in procuring

laboratory

space

subjects

and

for

both

my

thesis

and

dissertation. He made the impossible doable.
Also, many thanks to the New Hampshire Public Defenders

for

their

friendship

and

support,

and

for

allowing me to

(ab)use their laser printer.
I

would like to extend my deepest appreciation to all of

the people who did not ask "How much longer are you going to
be in school?".
I

wasn't

wish to thank A1 Hough for egging me on in something he

convinced

I

could

do.

And

also

Lee

Thomson,

for

occasional lunches, where she would listen to half-baked ideas
and often provide a needed dash of common sense. Both of them

have been good friends for most of my life.
I'd like to thank my mother and Bill Kipouras for all

that they have done: For longstanding faith and frequent help,
for love and good wishes.
I'd like to thank my father for many of my personality

traits, without which

I

would never have perservered. He

VI

instilled in me the need to strive and the will to finish. He
has helped me more than he'll ever know.

Much credit also goes to my wife's family for putting up
with the added stress that this has put on their life: To
Beany Atwood and Chris Pratt for everpresent good cheer and
friendship, to Biscuit Atwood and Rick Smith for safe harbour,
and to Debbi and Fred Atwood for their considerable help,

undying faith, frequent commiseration throughout this process,
and for understanding what it meant. Rick Smith referred to it
as 'relentless encouragement', and
I

can

truly

say

that

without

I

can find no better words.

them,

this

would

not

have

occurred.

Most importantly, I'd like to thank my wife. Bear, and
our son Corwin. Without them, there would have been no point.

Vll

ABSTRACT

REPRESENTATION OF NUMERICAL INFORMATION:
EXPLORATION OF THE CATEGORY STRUCTURE OF
DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMERICAL STIMULI
FEBRUARY 1992

ROBERT KEVIN STONE
B.A. KEENE STATE COLLEGE

M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Arnold

D.

Well

A series of experiments explored the nature of the memory

representation of numerical

information.

Two distributions

were presented to each subject as three-digit numbers paired
with

distribution

conditions

were

labels.

used

in

Three

presentation

stimulus

Experiment

1:

a

rapid

presentation as used in Malmi and Samson (1983);
requires the subject to retype each

classification

task

in

which the

stimulus

subject must

serial

a task

which

item;

and

supply the

category name when presented with the stimulus number.
Experiment

1,

subjects estimated the averages of the
viii

a

In

distributions they were presented. In Experiment
classified

an

additional

items,

40

subjects

2,

chosen

to

enable

discrimination between two classes of models of memory
representation. Subjects in Experiment

made estimates of

3

the frequency of scores per decade for each distribution. The

results strongly favor the category density model (Fried and
Holyoak,

1984)

abstracts
'normal'

,

a

model

distributional

which

assumes

information

that

and

the

subject

a

default

uses

distribution to organize the incoming information.

The Nosofsky (1988) exemplar similarity model did not predict

subject

classification

estimation

as

accurately

behavior
as

the

or

category

Reasons for these findings are discussed.

IX

subject

frequency

density

model.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

One of the major topics in cognitive psychology is

categorization. Categorization is the act of organizing
one's world into understandable units, without which, the

world would in fact be "one big blooming buzzing
Confusion" (James, 1892, p.l6). For a review of the
efforts which have been made to understand categorization
behavior, as well as a discussion of the various models

which have been proposed, see Smith and Medin (1981)

.

The present set of studies was designed to try to

understand how numerical information is represented in
memory, and how the stored information is used to make

subsequent judgments of category membership. Subjects were

presented with numerical information belonging to two
categories of three-digit numbers using several different

presentation procedures. They were then asked to estimate
the average value of each category, to classify additional
items into categories, and to generate frequency

histograms for each category. The categories were composed
of sets of numbers having specified means, variances, and

distribution shapes.
Several earlier studies have investigated how people

process numerical information. For example, studies have
1

,

values of categories of numbers (Malmi and Samson, 1983)
to estimate the strength of relation between covarying

sets of numbers,

(e.g.

Stone and Well, in review), and to

predict scores on one variable from scores on another
based on experience with covarying pairs of scores on the
two variables (Malmi, 1986). Malmi and Samson (1983) asked

subjects for various types of information after having

rapidly presented 100 numbers that were a randomly ordered

mixture of members of two categories and showed that
people retain enough of the numerical and category
information to provide good estimates of an average (mean)
value of each category.
In their first experiment, Malmi and Samson (1983)

established that subjects could make accurate estimates of
average values of serially presented numbers from two
categories. Experiment

2

attempted to determine further

what kind of information about the categories the subjects
retained. Malmi and Samson tried to rule out the exclusive
use of some sort of on-line 'strategic combination', such
as maintaining a running average, by asking subjects for

their estimates of the average after informing them that
scores greater than a certain value were to be ignored.

Subjects were able to give good estimates of the average
of the truncated distribution, suggesting that the

estimates were most likely generated at the moment of
2

.

request, and not the result of using some 'running
average' strategy. For both experiments, subjects'

estimates of the 'average' value of the categories were
more similar to the means of the presented distributions
of numbers than to the modes or medians of those

distributions
In their third experiment, Malmi and Samson attempted

to determine whether subjects retained information about

the distributions of presented scores. They asked subjects
to estimate the number of items in each decade (that is,
by tens, e.g., 270-279, 280-289, etc.) that had been

presented for each category. Although the distributions

generated by subjects were similar to the distributions of
the presented stimuli, they tended to be considerably less
skewed. Malmi and Samson explained this finding by

suggesting that category boundaries may have been obscured
in the subjects' minds,

leading to 'borrowing' of

exemplars between distributions.

These experiments address several interesting issues
about human information processing. The most important of
these concerns the issue of mental representation. What
did Malmi and Samson's subjects have stored in their

memories that allowed them to answer questions about the

distributions of numbers with which they had been
presented?

Addressing this question would clearly aid in
3

.

understanding categorization of numerical stimuli, and
possibly of other types of information as well.
The principles by which information about

a

category

is organized have been the focus of much research. One

camp (Reed, 1972, Posner and Keele, 1968, Neumann, 1977,

Rosch and Mervis, 1975) holds that information concerning
the most representative values per aspect or dimension of
the category is abstracted from the experienced examples.

The central tendencies of each dimension are combined to
create a prototype, or best example of the category, and
it is this best example which is retained and used in

making subsequent category membership decisions.

This

view would hold that a judgment about the category

membership of a stimulus is based on the similarity of the
stimulus to the prototype, relative to the similarity of
the stimulus to the prototypes of other categories (Posner
and Keele,

1968)

Exemplar Models

Medin and Schaffer (1978) proposed

a

context model

which differed from the prototype models in several
important ways. The most important assumption of the

context model for the present purposes is that what is

retained is not an abstraction of the information

presented (such as

a prototype)

but rather a

representation of the specific items (exemplars) that were
4

presented, along with information about their category

membership. Categorization of a subsequently presented
item occurs by comparing it with the stored

representations of the exemplars belonging to each
category. Categorization is determined by the relative

strength of the similarity of the item to the collection
of exemplars comprising each category.

According to the Medin and Schaffer context model,
similarity of the probe to each exemplar is computed as
the product of the similarities per dimension, and these

products of similarity from each exemplar to the probe are
then summed over the exemplars in the category. These

summed similarities are the basis of categorization
decisions, with the probability of categorizing an item as
a

member of a particular category being equal to the

evidence (in terms of the summed similarities) for that

category divided by the sum of the evidence for all
categories. The category with the highest similarity to
the probe has the highest probability being chosen.

The use of a multiplicative rule allows for the

dimensional similarities to interact in producing a

measure of the overall similarity of a probe to an
exemplar.

If,

for example, one sees a chair, most of the

stored examples (exemplars) which are excited by being

similar to the stimulus will be chairs, due to some degree
5

of similarity along each dimension shared between the

exemplars and the object in question. And since the item
excites more stored exemplars of other chairs than

exemplars of any other category of stored representations,
the object will likely be classified as a chair.

Nosofsky (1984,1986,1988,1991) has further discussed
the issue of similarity of multidimensional exemplars to

probes (incoming items that are to be classified)

.

Using

stimuli that occupy locations in multidimensional space,

Nosofsky proposed that the relation between distance
between items in the space and similarity

(r^j^)

(dj,)

of the

items to one another is given by the equation

ilix=e

where
dj^

-cd ix

is the similarity between exemplar

i

and probe

x,

represents psychological distance between them in the

space, and c is a scaling parameter reflecting the overall

level of discriminability. The numerical stimuli used in

the present research fall along a single dimension, so

that distance between the to-be-classified item and any

other item can be construed to be the difference in
values,

if we assume that distance is linear.
6

The

;

equation implies that items which are very close to
the
probe would be considered to be very similar, but that

similarity diminishes very rapidly as distance increases.
It is essentially this similarity (dissimilarity) of the

to-be-classified item to specific stored exemplars which
drives classification behavior.
Further, Nosofsky proposes that if there are two

categories,

Cj

and

the probability that item x will be

classified as belonging to category

instead of category

Cj

C 2 is

P(qlX)

The right-hand side of the equation is the weighted sum of
the similarities of the items in category

classified item

X,

Cj

to the to-be-

divided by that sum plus the weighted

sum of the similarities of the items in category

to-be-classified item

X.

The parameter

for preference of Category

Cj

to the

is a bias weight

Since there is no need to

1.

assume any such bias, for the work described here, this
will be held at

.5,

and will then cancel out of the

equation.
Medin, Altom and Murphy,

(1984)

have

suggested

a

model which combines the ideas that exemplars are stored
7

along with the idea that prototypes are abstracted from

presented categorical information. They suggest that
although what is stored are exemplars, they may be

organized around best example abstracted prototype
information. Whittlesea 1987
(

)

in his examination of these

,

models as tools towards understanding memory, concluded
that "the use or development of abstract, semantic

representation is not automatic"

,

and is dependent upon

factors such as task constraints and the structure of the
stimuli involved (p.l6), while the storage of exemplars is
automatic. Similar issues have been discussed in the area
of belief updating, which is concerned with the serial

integration of information. Anderson,

(1985)

puts forth a

theory which suggests that in a belief updating situation,
one takes the first few items and combines them into one

representation, but that one also has access to subsequent
(recent)

specific-item information for

a short time,

in

order to evaluate any need to modify one's representation,
but that this specific-item information fades as the

information loses its immediacy.
Category Density Model
Fried and Holyoak (1984) and Flannagan, Fried and

Holyoak (1986) have developed a category density model to
account for categorization of quantitative stimuli.

According to this model,

a

representation is formed on the
8

basis of experience with category members, which consists
of descriptors of the underlying distributions (such
as

the mean and some sense of the variability and shape of
the distribution)

.

The model uses a measure of relative

likelihood to make classification judgments. This relative

likelihood rule functions as follows:

"The probability of classifying an instance into
a particular category is proportional to the relative

likelihood that the item was generated by that

category's distribution relative to the distributions
of other categories"

(Flannagan et al., 1986, p.242).

This probability of classification, as stated in
Fried and Holyoak (1984) is based on Bayes' rule. Given
two possible categories,

C,

and C 2

,

when classifications

are made after a period where category items have been
learned, and there is no bias towards one category over

the other,

the probability of an item X being classified

as a member of

C,

is

P(qlX)

p{x\ q) p(q)
P{X\ q) p(q) +Pix\ q) p(q)

9

.

.

Fried and Holyoak suggest that people expect each

dimension of a stimulus to be normally distributed within
a

category (Assumption #3, p.235). Given this assumption,

people abstract, or develop a schematic description
including (at least in a situation where the dimension is

normally distributed) the mean value and an idea of the

variability from their experience with examples of the
category. It is this abstract description which is

subsequently used to make classification decisions. The

description is subject to revision, depending upon
information about relative likelihood of the stimuli

experienced and how well the stimuli fit the

representation
In the current research, two overlapping

unidimensional distributions were employed. The relative
likelihood, or relative probability of an item X belonging
to category

C,

can be thought of graphically as the ratio

of the height of the frequency distribution for category
Cj

to the sum of the heights of the distributions

representing the categories
Figure

C,

and C 2

at point X.

(See

1)

Fried and Holyoak (1984) used multidimensional
stimuli comprised of normally distributed feature
dimensions. This was done

(1)

10

to test a specific version

.

of their model, and

(2)

.

in consideration of the

possibility that

"Normal distributions may have particular

ecological importance. Basic-level natural categories
seem to consist of a dense central region of typical
instances, surrounded by sparser regions of atypical

instances (Rosch, 1973, Rosch and Mervis, 1975,
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976)

People may therefore expect new categories to be

unimodal and to have roughly symmetric density
functions.

.
.

"

(p. 235)

This suggests that people may have

a

'default

distribution' which they use to try to describe any
category, even in the absence of evidence about the shape
of the category distribution. One can think of this

default distribution shape (and associated descriptors) as
a

heuristic model which people employ to get

a

rough

estimate of the category on the basis of little
information, instead of waiting until there is a large

collection of exemplars to use to make subsequent
classifications. Evidence for people having a small set of

heuristic tools in other areas of psychology which are
used to approach specific problem situations has been
11

p
r
0
a
b
1
1
i
t

y

Figure

1.

Two overlapping unimodal distributions.

12

:

found in the area of judgment under uncertainty (eg.

,

Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1982) and in the area of
roultiple-cue probability learning (eg., Brehmer,

1974).

Thus, the category density model assumes that people

have a default distribution, that they use it to organize
information, that distributional descriptors describing
the stimuli are associated with this default distribution
model, and that classification decisions are based on a

ratio of the probability density of the to-be-classified
item for each candidate category. This ratio is a measure
of the relative probability density at that point. The

probability density for any normal distribution is:

f(y)=

—

20^

Ov/271

which can be transformed by z=(y

- p) /or

which simplifies

the calculations by putting the function in terms of z-

scores

f{z)=-^e'

2

The relative probability of an item X belonging to

C,

situation where there are two possible equally likely

categories which overlap is:
13

in a

.

P(qix)

f (z^,) +f (z^2)

In a study by Flannagan et al.

the focus was

(1986)

on whether classification behavior is driven by category

distribution "shape", and whether subjects assume that

a

dimension within a category is 'normally distributed', or
at least unimodal and symmetric. They tested this by

looking at classification behavior when the stimulus

dimensions had either unimodal or U-shaped distributions.
Subjects learned about a multidimensional category of
stimuli, for which two dimensions were distributed

'normally' and the third had a U-shaped distribution)

These stimuli were in the form of 'Blockist paintings'
either painted by an artist 'Vango' or not. Subjects made

classifications of the paintings and were given feedback.
Subjects were then asked to classify an additional set of
these paintings without feedback about their accuracy.

Flannagan et al. found that subjects classified items as
if the distribution were unimodal even when the true

distribution was U-shaped. Only after protracted
experience with examples of the category

(

> 250 trials)

did their classification behavior begin to reflect the
non— unimodal nature of the stimulus dimension. The index

used was the quadratic coefficient of the mean responses
14

for the transfer classification task for the dimension. A

reliable positive value is consistent with a bimodal
distribution, and it was only after this protracted

experience that the quadratic coefficient was

significantly positive. At a middle value of 150 trials,
the trend becomes a flat pattern.

Flannagan et al.

interpret this as indicating that the inapplicability of
the normal curve has been understood, but the learner has
not yet developed an alternative model from the data.

Flannagan et al.'s (1986) results supported both of
their assumptions. There was a clear bias in the

classification data towards using a normal distribution
model. This was manifested in the quadratic trend

describing the classification behavior, and supports the
idea that subjects initially applied a unimodal

distribution to the stimuli in a situation where the
dimension was distributed as a U-shaped function. This
idea provides a possible explanation for the behavior of

subjects in Malmi and Samson's Experiment

3,

in which the

frequency distributions generated by subjects had

considerably less skew than the distributions that had
been presented.
The goal of the present research was to investigate

how information about numerical stimuli is represented,
including what information is derived from the stimuli as
15

well as what structure and information is imposed by
the
learner. Numerical information similar to that used by

Malmi and Samson (1983) was used. This type of stimulus

material has several advantages over other sorts of
stimuli, especially with regards to perceptual issues that

must be considered when using pictorial stimuli. If, for
example, stimuli such as lines of different length are
used, one has to be concerned about whether the stimuli

are discriminable from one another. However, as stated by

Krueger, Rothbart, and Sriram (1989),

"...numbers are

unambiguous. For example, when the stimulus is 173, it is

unlikely to be misperceived as a different number." So

whatever behavior is represented in a response is postperceptual.

Numbers from two categories were presented to the
subjects, and various responses were required that

addressed the following questions
1.

What kind of information from these distributions

is retained by the subject,

and is this information

dependent upon the processing demands of the stimulus
presentation?
2.

Is there a bias towards representing category

information as though it were normally distributed?
3.

How is this information used in classifying

subsequent stimulus items?
16

The first experiment was a replication of Malmi and

Samson (1983)

.

Malmi and Samson found that subjects could

make accurate estimates of the averages of sets of threenumbers when they were presented rapidly to avoid

strategic encoding effects, and that they could generate
frequency histograms which reflected, at least at a gross
level, a reasonable approximation of the distributions

with which they had been presented.

Experiment

1

examined

subjects' ability to estimate the means of two overlapping

categories containing numerical information. In one
condition, the stimuli were presented as in the Malmi and

Samson (1983) experiments, thus replicating Malmi and
Samson's Experiment

1.

In two additional conditions,

different types of stimulus presentation which allowed
subjects to have more interaction with the category

members were used. One of these was similar to a task used
in Krueger et al.

(1989)

and required subjects to type in

each stimulus as it is shown to them for each trial. The

second was a classification task, in which the subject was

presented a number, but not the category name, and was
asked to supply the correct name. The subject was then
given feedback about the accuracy of the classification.

Subject estimates of the average value of each category in
the three conditions were compared.

17

Experiment

2

was designed to identify the rule used

by subjects in a classification task following

presentation of stimuli using one of the presentation
methods tested in Experiment

1.

Specifically, it compared

the Nosofsky (1988) version of the Medin and Schaffer
(1978)

context model with a version of the Fried and

Holyoak (1984) category density model by having subjects
make classification decisions about a set of items
following presentation of the category information as in

Experiment

1.

Experiment

3

investigated how accurately subjects can

generate frequency histograms of the presented stimuli,
and whether subjects are predisposed to treat

distributions as though they were normal, as suggested by
Flannagan et al.
Experiments

2

and

(1986)
3

.

The patterns of results in

can be considered as converging

evidence about how subjects appear to represent

unidimensional categorical information.

18

CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT

2

1

The first experiment was designed to examine the

effects of three different stimulus presentation

procedures on subjects' estimates of average values of

distributions of numerical stimuli. These three methods
have different levels of processing demands, and can be

considered as three points along a continuum from passive

observation to active interaction. The first presentation

procedure was that used by Malmi and Samson (1983)

,

a

rapid serial presentation of three-digit numbers which
were from two overlapping distributions which were
labelled by three letter CVC non-words. Malmi and Samson

presented each of the 100 pairs for 1.5 seconds, with

a

200 msec interstimulus interval.

The second method of stimulus presentation was

suggested by Krueger et al.

(1989)

,

who used two groups of

three-digit numbers selected from distributions with

particular characteristics. Instead of presenting the
numbers rapidly in order to prevent the use of strategies
as did Malmi and Samson, Krueger et al. asked their

subjects to reproduce each item as it was presented, in
order to insure that they attended to the information.
asked
After subjects were shown a stimulus item, they were
19

to type the item, along with its label. They were also

asked to estimate the cumulative averages for each

category after each eight items.
The results obtained by Malmi and Samson (1983) and

Krueger et al.

(1989) were similar,

except that the

standard deviations of the estimates were smaller in the

Krueger et al. task, indicating that on the average, each
subject's estimate of the average value of the

distributions was closer to the actual mean value.
The third method of stimulus presentation involved

a

classification task. Subjects were instructed that they
would see two groups of numbers (described as SAT scores
from two different social groups)

,

and that they were to

assign the proper group label (of the two supplied) to
each item that they saw. They were told that the

categories could overlap, so that they would not be
frustrated when they received information which appeared
to contradict earlier information. The subjects were

informed about the accuracy of their response, and

presented with the correct answer on each trial. A onesecond 60 Hz tone of moderate volume was presented after
each incorrect classification. Subjects went through the
list once, and were then asked for their estimates of the

average value of each category.
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As stated above, the presentation methods
used in

this experiment can be thought to define a
continuum from

passive observation to active categorization. One of
the

questions addressed is whether these different

presentation methods result in differences in subjects'
abilities to estimate the average values of stimulus
distributions. It was expected that a method like that

used in Krueger et al.

(1989)

would elicit estimates that

were more accurate than those elicited by the Malmi and
Samson procedure, and that the estimates from subjects

actively involved in making category decisions would be
even more accurate.
It is important to consider the variability of the

estimates provided by subjects. If subjects each randomly

remembered one item from each distribution along with its
category label, and gave this number as their estimate,
then the average of their estimates might approximate the
true distribution average. However, the standard deviation
of these estimates would then approximate the standard

deviation of the distribution. If on the other hand
subjects remembered all of the items perfectly and

computed means accurately, then the standard deviations of
these estimates should be approximately zero.
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Method
Sub*] ects

Sixty undergraduates from the University of

Massachusetts, Amherst served as subjects in exchange for
course credit.

Materials Stimulus sets of 50 three-digit items were
constructed for each of the categories. These sets had
means (and standard deviations) of 530 (30.0) for Category
A,

and 419.5 (50.0) for the unimodal Category B, and 421.5

(66.1)

for the bimodal Category B. The sets of items used

are listed in Appendix B.

The category labels DAP and PIM were the same labels

used by Malmi and Samson (1983), who chose them because
they had similar pronounceability ratings, according to

Underwood and Schulz (1960).

[An informal pilot study done

in preparation for the proposed research showed that

pronounceability of category labels had some effect on
accuracy of average value estimate in a task such as Malmi
and Samson employed in their first experiment.]

Subjects

were presented with items from either two unimodal

symmetric distributions, or one unimodal and one bimodal
symmetric distribution. The distributions overlapped by

approximately 65 points. The unimodal distributions were
formed by randomly sampling from a normal distribution

using SYSTAT, and these samples were given certain means
and variances. The bimodal distributions was created as
22

follows: Unimodal distributions were sampled from
a normal

distribution using SYSTAT, and were given
and standard deviations (See below)

.

a

certain means

These same

distributions were divided at the mean, and the range from
the highest lowest)
(

item to the mean was determined. This

value was then subtracted (added) to each value so that
the lower half of the distribution became the upper half,
and the upper half became the lower half.

The category with the larger mean, referred to as

Category A, was a unimodal distribution with a mean of 530
and a standard deviation of 30. The other category

(Category
a

B)

could be either unimodal or bimodal, and had

mean of 419.5 (unimodal) and 421.5 (bimodal), with

standard deviations of 50 and 66.1 respectively.

Procedure Subjects were assigned to one of two stimulus
conditions and one of three presentation conditions.
Subjects were run individually, and a session took

approximately 15 minutes. Following the procedure of Malmi
and Samson (1983), subjects were instructed that they

would be presented with guidance counselor records, and
that they were to imagine that they were guidance

counselors while evaluating the information.
Instructions in appendix

A)

.

(See

Subjects were presented with

information from either two unimodal and symmetric

overlapping distributions, or from one unimodal and one
23
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bimodal distribution. Stimuli were presented by computer
in one of three presentation conditions;
(1)

1.5 seconds per item, with a .2 second ISI, as in

Malmi and Samson (1983)
(2)

as a self-paced task in which subjects were required

to type in the information for each stimulus as it

appeared on the screen, as in Krueger et al.

(1989)

or
(3)

as a category learning task in which the subject was

presented with the numerical stimulus and was required to
supply a category label by typing it on the computer
keyboard. The subject was informed of the accuracy of her

categorization by
categorization:
group'

.

a

statement following her

'YES (NO)

### is from the DAP (PIM)

All three groups of subjects were presented with

the same 100 stimulus items.

Following presentation, subjects were asked for the
average values for each group (DAP and PIM)

,

and told to

be as accurate as they possibly could.

Results
As can be seen in Table

1,

the means of subject

estimates of averages were reasonably close to the

objective averages for all presentation types and both
stimulus sets. Estimates of the Category A average value
24

Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of average values
estimated by subjects in Experiment 1.
Stimulus Conditions

Bimodal/Unimodal

Objective
Values

Unimodal/Unimodal

A

B

A

B

530.0

421.5

530.0

419.5

(30.0)

(66.1)

(30.0)

(50.0)

517.0*

430.5

508.7*

430.0

(16.9)

(35.9)

(12.5)

(22.9)

525.1

436.3

517.4*

416.5

(24.1)

(29.7)

(12.0)

(20.0)

520.1

443.4

524.7

418.4

(14.7)

(31.3)

(8.1)

(27.7)

Presentation
conditions
Rapid

Retyping

Classification

t-test of mean estimate and objective mean values. *=p<.05.
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were uniformly, and in half of the cases, significantly
lower than the actual category averages. Both of the

estimates from the rapid presentation groups were

significantly different from the objective value (t(19) =
5.446, p =.000 and t(19) = 2.438, p =.039) and both of the

estimates from the classification group were not, though
they were marginally different (p's =.067 and .062).

Estimates for Category B did not systematically vary from
the objective category means.

An analysis of variance was performed on the means to

ascertain whether there were any differences in the mean
estimates of average values due to either stimulus or

presentation conditions. There were no significant between
subjects differences, and the only within-subjects

difference was the main effect of category

(A vs.

B)

F(l,54) = 592.98, p = 0.000.

Chi-square tests were performed to determine whether
the variances of the subject estimates were significantly

smaller than the variances of the stimulus distributions. If
the variance of the estimate is smaller than the stimulus

distribution variance, chi-square should also be small. In
the present case, there were 10 subjects in each condition,
so that each test had df =

9

,

so that values of chi-square

less than 3.33 associated with an estimate variance were

considered significant at the p = .05 level. All variances
26

were significantly less than the stimulus variances, except
for the Category A bimodal/unimodal retyping condition

variance, which had a chi-square value of 5.81,
p

>

.

10

.

Since this effect is not exhibited in any of the other

retyping conditions, the conclusion is that it is Type

I

error, and not an interesting psychological phenomenon.

F-tests were performed to determine whether the

variances of the mean estimates differed across stimulus or

presentation conditions. There was a significant stimulus
condition difference for Category A in the classification

presentation condition (F(9,9) = 3.29, p

<

.05),

rapid presentation condition (F(9,9) = 4.03, p

<

and the
.05).

In

both cases, the variances of estimates for the

unimodal/unimodal condition were significantly smaller than
the variances from the bimodal/unimodal condition. This

could be construed as evidence for subjects' sensitivity to

differences (50 vs. 66) in variability. However, these
effects are reversed in subsequent experiments, so no such

conclusion seems warranted.
What is more important from the point of accuracy of
estimates is that, as in the Malmi and Samson (1983)
experiments, the standard deviation of the estimates is
lower than the standard deviation of the stimulus sets
(roughly half)

in 11 out of 12 cases. This suggests that
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subjects in all conditions have a representation that is
better than having stored a single item at random.
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2

The second experiment addressed the question of what

subjects retain from what they have been presented, how they

represent that retained information, and what information
they use in classifying new stimuli. What might subjects be

retaining about the information presented?

There are

several possibilities. First, Malmi and Samson's (1983)

research suggested that subjects did retain some specificitem information about the stimuli, and argued against

subjects use of a running average. Krueger et al.

(1989)

encouraged development of a running average by asking for
updated means every eight trials. They observed much better

performance in terms of both accuracy and variability than
Malmi and Samson, although this is probably due to the added
time and experience their subjects had with the stimulus

materials
Malmi and Samson's (1983) second experiment attempted
to address the issue of whether subjects developed running

averages. After all of the numbers had been presented, they

asked subjects to truncate the range of the scores

considered in generating their estimates of the average. The
results appeared to reflect the average of the truncated

distribution quite accurately. Malmi and Samson took these
29

results as evidence that subjects retained a representation
of the distribution of the numerical information
associated

with each category.
The present experiment investigated the nature of the

representation of the presented categories by using a

classification task. The use of classification tasks to
study category structure has a long history (e.g., Bruner,
Goodnow, and Austin, 1956,). Classification tasks have often

been used to address questions about what information is

stored in memory. Experiment

2

compares two models of

categorization to see which more accurately reflects what
subjects do in a classification task.

Subjects were presented with information from two

categories and were then asked to classify a new set of
items designed to discriminate among the types of

representations in question. Specifically, the Nosofsky
(1988)

version of Medin and Schaffer's (1978) context model

was tested against the Fried and Holyoak (1984) category

density model.
These models are of particular interest in that they
make precise assumptions about the underlying structure of
the mental representation, and permit specific predictions

about the probability of classifying any item in each
category.

The models were tested by having subjects

classify certain 'critical items'. These particular items
30

occurred in the area of overlap between the two
category
distributions, and were chosen because the predicted

probability of the item belonging to a given category was
high (greater than
than

.5)

.5)

according to one model, but low (less

according to the other model. The defining

characteristic of these critical items is that they were
more similar (exemplar similarity) to items from Category
but are more probable (relative probability) in Category

A,
B,

or vice versa. Since the models make contrasting

predictions, subjects can be categorized as being best

described by one model or the other, depending upon their
response in this forced choice classification task.
So,

subjects could be responding to

(1)

the relative

probability of the item being in each category (in terms of

probability density of the distribution) as suggested by the
category density model, described on page 12, or

(2)

the

evidence that the transfer item belongs to one category or
another, based on the summed similarity of the item to each
of the relevant exemplars in each category, which would be

consistent with the Nosofsky exemplar model as described on
page

9.

Similarity was computed using the similarity-

distance conversion

described in Nosofsky (1988).

The Nosofsky model was tested first by assuming that
the value of the parameter which represents discriminability
c was equal to 1

.

If c = 1,

there is a rapid decline in
31

similarity as distance increases, so that classification is

dominated by the nearest item in the memory set. If the
distance from the to-be-classified item to a copy of itself
in memory is zero, then the similarity measure

= 1. A

distance of one unit causes the value of that similarity
measure to fall to .368. Because of this rapid fall-off of
similarity with distance, the closest exemplar in memory

dominates the summed similarity, yielding, essentially,

a

nearest neighbor model (Chumbley, personal communication)

.

Subjects can be categorized as using one model or

another by a weighted function of their responses on these
critical items. If, for example, a subject made a

classification of category A for a transfer item, and this
classification is more probable under an exemplar model, it
was recorded as such, and was weighted by the difference of
the probabilities of it being classified as category A as

predicted by the different models. This procedure emphasizes
the items in the critical overlapping area, and devalues the

non-interesting (and non-discriminable) items in the tails
of the distributions where both models predict the same

classification behavior.

Classification behavior on these critical items was
examined to look at

(1)

which model does

a

better job of

describing subject behavior based on the average absolute
deviations of the models from the observed classification
32

behavior, and

(2)

whether either model does a good job in an

absolute sense of describing subject behavior.

Method
Subjects Eighty undergraduates from the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst and from Keene State College served
as subjects in exchange for course credit or a nominal sum
of money. Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions.

Materials The learning materials used were the same as in
Experiment

1,

with the addition of 39 transfer items without

category labels which the subjects were asked to classify
following exposure to the learning materials. These items

were chosen randomly from the entire range of possible
stimuli presented, except for a subset of critical items in
the bimodal/unimodal conditions and the unimodal/unimodal

conditions. These items were chosen to discriminate between
the category density model and the exemplar similarity model

because the models make different predictions about their

probable category membership, as explained above. The
critical items were identified by obtaining the

classification predictions for each integer point of the
entire range of the stimuli and comparing the predictions,
looking for points that made contrasting classification

predictions. These items naturally occurred in the area of
overlap. In several cases there was a cluster of points
33

.

which made contrary predictions, and in this case, the most

discriminative point was chosen.
Procedure Subjects were assigned to one of two stimulus

conditions (unimodal/unimodal or bimodal/unimodal) and one
of two presentation conditions (rapid presentation or

classification task presentation)

.

Subjects were run

individually in sessions that took approximately 20 minutes.
As in the first experiment, subjects were presented 50 pairs
of three-digit number and a three-letter nonsense syllable

from each

of two distributions. These item pairs were

randomly ordered. The distributions were the same as those
used in Experiment

1.

Instructions were similar to those used in Experiment
(See Appendix A)

,

1

and stated that the subject was to

consider herself a guidance counselor, to evaluate the
information, and that she would be expected to answer

questions about the information presented. Following

presentation of the stimuli, subjects were placed in the
transfer task, where they were presented with the new items,
and were asked to give them their category identifiers. The

transfer task was couched in terms of having lost some of
the tags associated with the items (DAP's and PIM's), and

that the subjects' assistance in relabelling the unlabelled
items was required, based on what they knew about the

categories
34

Subjects were also asked to rate their confidence in
their categorizations on a five-point scale. This allows us
to view the data on a finer grained level. If, for example,

subjects are responsive to the relative probability (in
terms of z-score distance from the mean) of an item

belonging to a given category, then their confidence in
their categorizations should decline as the difference in

relative probability declines (as a condition of the item

belonging to each category approaches .5). This should also
be true if subjects respond to differences in measures of

similarity. Each of these models predict a decline in

confidence as the boundaries of the categories (however they
are represented)

is approached. A deviation from this

pattern of decline would suggest that neither of these
models adequately explains the data.

Results
The possible results we expected from this experiment
were:
(1)

That subjects would make classifications which

appeared to be based on the nearest neighbor exemplar model,
a
in which case we would conclude that they were using such

model, and that the value of the scalar c is approximately
for this experimental situation.
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1

The results could appear to be the result of

(2)

subjects using the category-density model or an exemplar

model with a lower value for c.
As can be seen in Table 2, the mean estimates and the

standard deviations of subjects mean estimates are similar
to those in Experiment
results)

.

1

(See Table

1

for Experiment

1

Estimates of average values were low in the

Category A groups compared to the objective values
(significantly so for the rapid presentation groups,
(unimodal group = 516.8, t(19) = 3.098, p =.006, and bimodal

group = 517.6, t(19) = 3.289, p =.004) and not so for the

classification groups

(p

=.879 and .841 respectively)). This

further supports the idea that accuracy may be affected by
amount of interaction with the stimulus: classification

subjects provided estimates that never differed

significantly from objective values, while rapid

presentation subjects differed significantly from objective
values on the Category A estimates. Estimates for Category B

were not different from the objective values for either

presentation condition.
An analysis of variance was performed to ascertain

whether there were any differences between subjects
estimates of average values due to stimulus or presentation

36
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1

Table 2. Means (and standard deviations) of average values
estimated by subjects in Experiment 2.
Stimulus Conditions
B imoda 1 / Un imoda

Objective
Values

A

B

530.0

421.5

U n imoda 1 / Un imoda
A

B

530.0

419.5

(30.0)

(50.0)

413.2

516.8*

429.1

(23.9)

(19.0)

(29.8)

529.4

420.7

529.5

422.2

(13.2)

(38.7)

(14.5)

(29.4)

(30.0)

(

517.6*
(16.9)

66 1
.

)

Presentation
conditions
Rapid

Classification

t-test of mean estimate and objective mean values. *=p<.05.
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conditions. As in Experiment

,

there were no significant

1,

between-subjects effects, and again, the only withinsubjects effect was the main effect of Category

(A vs.

B)

F(l,76) = 797.4, p = 0.000.

Chi-square tests were performed to compare the
variances of estimates of the averages to the stimulus

distribution variances. With df = 19, any chi-square less
than 10.12 associated with an estimate variance is

considered significant at the p = .05 level. All estimate
variances are significantly less than the stimulus
variances
F-tests were performed on the variances of the

estimates to ascertain whether there were any differences
due to stimulus or presentation conditions. There was a

significant effect of presentation condition on Category B
mean estimate variances in the bimodal/unimodal stimulus

condition (F(19,19) = 2.62, p

<

.05). The variance of the

estimates were significantly smaller in the rapid

presentation condition than in the classification condition.
Since this effect is reversed in Experiment

conclusion is that this is Type

I

1,

the

error.

Subjects classified 39 items following presentation of
the initial stimulus set. The models make conflicting

predictions about several 'critical items'.

(The actual

number of items which can be considered critical items is
38

for different distribution conditions, as well as

different values of c for the Nosofsky model.)
There are several ways of looking at the classification
data which allow us to examine how well the models describe
the subjects' behavior. The first, and most coarse-grained

analysis is a simple 'head count'

.

It can be determined for

each subject which model accounts for more classifications
of the critical items. These results are fairly unambiguous.

The category density model best describes 28 out of 40 of
the subjects in the bimodal/unimodal condition. The exemplar

similarity model best describes 11 out of 40 and there was
one tie. For the unimodal/unimodal condition, the count was
37 out of 40 favoring the category density model,

and

3

out

of 40 favoring the exemplar similarity model. Binomial tests

were performed on these values against the null hypothesis
that they should each best describe 20 out of 40 subjects
due to chance. All counts were significantly different from
20

.

We then compared the observed classification behavior

with predictions of the models. As can be seen in Tables
and

4,

3

the category density model does a much better job of

predicting actual classification probabilities than does the
exemplar similarity model. The tables compare the observed

proportion of classifications with the predicted proportions
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Table 3 Observed and predicted classification probabilities
for critical items for classification subjects at c = l.
.

Stimulus condition
B imoda 1 / Un imoda 1

Observed
Critical
Items
467
476
481
487
491
500
509
519

average
absolute
deviation

8500
7500
6000
6500
6000
7000
6000
0500

Un imoda 1 / Un imoda

Predicted
Observed
Predicted
Density Exemplar
Density Exemplar
model
model
model
model
.8778
.7816
.7149
.6277
5685
.4437
.3417
.2598

.3436
.1407
.1601
.3437
.5663
.4627
.2666
. 6565

1191

.5181

.

.

1

.0000
.8500
.7500
.7500
.6500
.2500
.2000
.3000

.8526
.7258
.6375
.5244
.4505
.3050
.1995
1247

.2810
.2714
.1323
.0351
.7114
.6049
.6040
.0249

1300

.4657

.

.

Note: All probabilities are for Category B. Critical items
are in bold-face type.
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Table 4 Observed and predicted classification probabilities
for critical items for rapid presentation subjects at c = l.
.

Stimulus condition
B imoda 1 / Un imoda 1

Observed
Critical
Items
467
476
481
487
491
500
509
519

4500
6470
5000
4500
7500
4500
4000
0500

Predicted
Density Exemplar
model
model
.8778
.7816
.7149
.6277
5685
.4437
.3417
.2598
.

.3436
.1407
.1601
.3437
.5663
.4627
.2666
.6565

Un imoda 1 / Un imoda

Observed
Predicted
Density Exemplar
model
model
.8500
.8823
.7000
.5500
.4210
.3500
.1500
.3000

average
absolute
.3560
deviation
1764
Note: All probabilities are for Category
are in bold-face type.
.
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.8526
.7258
.6375
.5244
.4505
.3050
.1995
1247
.

.

B.

.2810
.2714
.1323
.0351
.7114
.6049
. 6040
.0249

4411
Critical items

0683

.

.

from each model at each critical item. The absolute values
of the deviations were averaged for each model for each

presentation group for these items. For the classification
group, the average absolute deviation is .1191 from observed
for the category density model, and .5181 for the exemplar

similarity model in the bimodal/unimodal condition. This is

paralleled in the unimodal/unimodal condition, with the
category density model = .1300 and the exemplar similarity
model = .4657. Thus, all of the classification subjects are
better described by the category density model than by the

exemplar similarity model. As can be seen in Table

4,

this

is paralleled by the average absolute deviations from the

rapid presentation subjects in both stimulus conditions as
well

Goodness of fit of each model to the data in each

presentation condition was tested using the Chi-square
goodness-of-f it test. Frequencies for the models were
acquired by multiplying the predicted probabilities by n

(=

20). As can be seen in Table 5, the category density model
is not different from observed behavior in either

unimodal/unimodal condition (classification Chi-square =
10.17, df=8, p>.10, rapid Chi-square = 6.17, df=8, p>.50),

or in the bimodal/unimodal condition (classification Chi-

square = 10.72, df=8, p>.10, rapid Chi-square = 11.68, df=8,
p>.10)

.

The Chi-square tests for the exemplar model were
42

Tsbls 5. Chi squar© values (and p values) for qoodness of
fit tests of models to observed proportions of
classifications. For c = l.

Category
Density

Unimodal/Unimodal

Classification
Rapid

Bimodal/Unimodal

df =

orob.

Exemplar
Similaritv

orob

8

10.170

<.100

429.420

<.001

6.170

<.500

257.860

<.001

<

df =

8

Classification

10.720

<.100

132.940

Rapid

11.680

<.100

49.320
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001

<.001

significant for all conditions at p=.000. Thus, the exemplar
model does not fit the observed subject classification

behavior in any condition, whereas the predicted proportions
of classification behavior from the category density model

not significantly different from the observed behavior.
However, there does seem to be some indication that

subjects are responding to exemplar information. The

observed probabilities in Tables

3

and

4

should all decrease

as the values increase (assuming the category density model
is a valid model of subject behavior)

.

This occurs in the

unimodal/unimodal groups, but there are points in the
bimodal/unimodal data which appear to be responsive to the

concentration of stimuli for that category, and not
responsive to

a

model which assumes a unimodal model.

This suggests that either subjects may be behaving in

a

manner consistent with the category density model, or
behaving in a manner consistent with the exemplar similarity
model in which c is much less than

1.

As c gets smaller, the

exemplar similarity model behaves less like a nearest
neighbor model, and exemplars farther away from the target
item have a increased influence on classification behavior.

Therefore, the analyses described above were repeated at

various values of c to determine the value of c at which the

chi-square is minimized, and so, at which value the model
best fits the subjects' classification behavior.
44
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The value of c for which the chi-square
is minimized
for the bimodal/unimodal condition is c =
.11, at which
point, the chi-squares (df = 7) are: classification
=

13.24

(P >

.05),

and rapid presentation = 7.94

(p <

.25).

For the

unimodal/unimodal condition, the best fitting value of c =
.022. The chi-square values at this level of c are:

classification =27.02
14.99 (p < .05)

(p <

See Tables

.001), and rapid presentation =
6

and

7

for a comparison of the

average absolute deviations of the exemplar similarity model
at its best fit with the deviations from the category

density model.
Comparing these models using either the average
absolute deviations or the Chi-square values, we can see
that in three of the four cases, the category density model
still does a better job of explaining the data than does the

exemplar similarity model. Also, as c gets smaller (and

discriminability amongst the exemplars decreases)

,

the

models tested here also become harder to discriminate. At a
value of c =

.2,

there cease to be any items for which the

models make contrasting predictions in the bimodal/unimodal
condition. And at the limit of c =

0,

each exemplar

contributes equally to the summed similarity to the probe
item.

More importantly, in terms of the goals of this
research, as c assumes very small values, the Chi-square
45

Table 6. Observed and predicted classification probabilities
for critical items for classification subjects at bestfitting c.

Stimulus condition

Bimodal/Unimodal

Unimodal/Unimodal

c = .11

Observed
Critical
Items
467
476
481
487
491
500
509
519

8500
7500
6000
6500
6000
7000
6000
0500

average
absolute
deviation

Chi-square (min)

c =

.022

Predicted
Observed
Predicted
Density Exemplar
Density Exemplar
model
model
model
model
.8778
.7816
.7149
6277
5685
.4437
.3417
2598
.

.

.

.

1191

.6379
5375
.5375
.5363
.5179
.4504
3803
.2893
.

.

.

1

0000
.8500
.7500
.7500
6500
.2500
.2000
.3000

.

.

1739

13.24
p >

.

05

Note: All probabilities are for Category B.
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.8526
.7258
6375
5244
.4505
.3050
1995
1247

.5521
.4871
.4522
.4116
.3865
3333
.2886
.2396

1300

.2429

.

.

.

.

.

.

27.02
P > .001

1

1

Table 7 Observed and predicted classification probabilities
for critical items for rapid presentation subjects at bestfitting c.
.

Stimulus condition
B imoda 1 / Un imoda
c = . 11

Observed
Critical
Items
467
476
481
487
491
500
509
519

4500
6470
5000
4500
7500
4500
4000
0500

average
absolute
deviation

Unimoda 1/Un imoda
c =

Predicted
Density Exemplar
model
model
.8778
.7816
.7149
6277
5685
.4437
.3417
2598
.

.

.

.

1764

.6379
.5375
.5375
.5363
.5179
.4504
.3803
2893
.

.

Chi-square (min)

1141

.8500
.8823
.7000
5500
.4210
.3500
.1500
.3000
.

.8526
.7258
6375
5244
.4505
.3050
1995
1247
.

.

.

.

.

7.94
p

>

.10

Note: All probabilities are for Category B.
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.

022

Observed
Predicted
Density Exemplar
model
model

0683

.5521
.4871
.4522
.4116
.3865
3333
.2886
.2396
.

.

1662

14.99
p <

.

05

.

values of goodness of fit of the model to the data
become
non-significant. This means that there is a range of values
for which the exemplar similarity model cannot be
rejected
(in that it is not significantly different from the
observed

classification behavior)
The confidence ratings told the expected story. Items

which could occur in either category resulted in confidence
ratings becoming lower than in areas where there was only
one viable category, as can be seen in Figure

2.

That the

ratings fall off as items rated are more equiprobable
(regardless of which model is considered) to be from either

category argues against a deterministic classification rule

whereby one chooses a value above which all items are of one
category and below which they are another, since this should
not exhibit a loss of confidence due to the probabilistic

nature of the stimuli. A test of the quadratic trend of
subjects confidence ratings yielded a significantly positive
value of t(36) = 11.496, p=0.000. The confidence ratings
appear to reflect the difficulty subjects faced in the

probabilistic portion of the task.
In the course of a discussion of how subjects may

represent the categories, it was suggested that, even in the
absence of feedback, subjects may have been adding the

transfer items to the categories in which they placed them
and thus changing the representation (Raney, personal
48
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communication)

.

To address this issue, some subjects were

asked to estimate how many items they had seen in the

presentation phase of the experiment, either prior to or
following the test phase of the experiment. This was done
for both the second and the third experiment and those

estimates are combined here. The mean estimate prior to test
= 61.8, and the mean estimate after test = 62.0, ns.

Apparently, subjects do not incorporate the test stimuli
into their representation of the categories, but are rather

using the category information as a static representation to

make classification decisions about the test stimuli. This

conclusion is consistent with other research in

classification (eg. Medin and Schaffer, 1978, Nosofsky,
1984, Hintzman,

1986).

Thus far, the evidence has argued strongly in favor of
the category density model both in terms of deviation of the

models from observed behavior, and in terms of absolute

goodness of fit of the model to the observed behavior. The
results here, in concert with the results of Experiment
argue that subjects are responsive to the probability

density of the item in its given candidate categories.
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CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT

4

3

The third experiment was prompted by the results of

Malmi and Samson's (1983) Experiment

3

in which they had

subjects generate frequency histograms, and by the

unresolved issues in the previous experiment. In the Malmi
and Samson study, subjects were characterized as

'conservative' in their representations of skew, in that

their generated distributions were more symmetric than were
the actual distributions of stimuli.

Malmi and Samson

interpreted this conservativeness as probably being due to
subjects "borrowing" information across categories. That is,
subjects could have stored the numbers accurately, but not
have been sure of the category labels. Also, it may be that
subjects concentrated on the number as a retrieval cue,

disregarding the category label, which would result in
sampling from both categories of exemplars. Flannagan et
al.'s (1986)

interpretation of their results relies on

subjects having developed an abstract representation which
is biased towards a unimodal distribution.

It is also

possible that this underrepresentation of the skew that was
observed by Malmi and Samson could have been the result of
asking subjects for an incomplete set of frequency estimates
(subjects were asked to estimate the frequencies for the 20
51

.

decades that they remembered best)

.

Underrepresentation of

the skewness of the distribution could result
if subjects
tended to remember information about the decades
near the
centers of the distributions, since most of the scores

reported by their subjects would occur around the center
of
the distributions. Malmi and Samson's task of asking for

a

histogram seems more likely to generate a clear
picture of what subjects have that is retrievable if it is
exhaustive; that is, if subjects are asked for estimates
from all parts of the presented distributions.
It is necessary to consider what subjects may be doing
in a task in which they are asked to make frequency

estimates of decade ranges of presented stimuli. If we
assume an exemplar similarity model, then subjects are using
the stated range (decade) and category label as cues by

which they probe their memory. If the model allows for
access to individual exemplars, then a count could be made
of how many exemplars were accessed. If the model does not

allow for this type of access to information, then subjects

would estimate a number, based on the strength of the
similarity, and then use that number as an anchor by which
to make subsequent estimates of frequency. This could be

done by comparing the initial strength to the strength

acquired from the new probe's similarity to memory
exemplars
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If instead we assume the category density model, then

subjects would need to develop estimates of frequency from

their representation. This representation has information
about the mean and variability of the category, and assumes
a normal distribution.

Subjects would make an initial

estimate for a given category, and then use the information
about where in the distribution that estimate occurred
(i.e., before or after the mean)

as an anchor. If the next

range probed were nearer to the mean, then the subject would
give a higher value for a frequency estimate, if further
from the mean, then the subject would give a lower value.

We have gained some insight into what subjects are

relying on in terms of their representation of categorical
information from the results of Experiment

methodology used in Experiment

3

2.

The

addresses a question about

the nature of that representation, by asking subjects what

they remember about the frequency of occurrence of items
presented.

Method

Subjects Eighty

‘

undergraduates from the University of

Massachusetts, Amherst and Keene State College served as
subjects in exchange for course credit or for a nominal sum
of money.
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.

Ma terials The learning materials used were
the same as in

Experiments

1

and

2

P rocedure Subjects were assigned to one of two
stimulus

conditions and one of two presentation conditions. Subjects

were run individually, and a session took approximately 20
minutes. The presentation phase was identical to Experiment
2;

subjects were presented the stimuli using either the

Malmi-type rapid presentation or the classification task.
Following presentation, subjects were asked to estimate how

many items had been presented for each decade of the range
of the presented information per category. For example, a

subject would be presented with the incomplete sentence:

The number of DAP's between 460 and 469 that appeared was:_.

(see instructions in Appendix A)

decade,

.

Subjects were presented a

(ie.460's) paired with a category label, and asked

to type in their best estimate of the number of items in

that category group they had been presented. Twenty-four

decades for Category B and 16 decades for Category A were
probed. The initial order of the statements was randomized,

and this order was then presented using a Latin square.
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Results
It was expected that subjects would underrepresent
the

non-normality of the bimodal distributions, and may
^®present them as unimodal. If subjects' frequency estimates
for the bimodal condition appear to be unimodal, then this

would be converging evidence for the category density model,
in that it would argue that there is a default way in which

we represent distributions of information. The results from

this experiment also enable us to address the unresolved
issues from Experiment

If subjects do represent

2.

information as exemplars (that is, veridically storing

specific-item information)

then the frequency histograms

,

should reflect the shape of the stimulus distributions.^
As can be seen in Table

8,

subject estimates of the

category averages were comparable to those in Experiments
and

2.

(See Tables

Experiments

1

and

1
2

and

2

1

for the comparable results of

respectively)

.

The estimates of the

average values were significantly different from the

objective value in the rapid presentation group in the

unimodal/unimodal condition (t(19) = 2.474, p =.023) and in
the classification group in the bimodal/unimodal condition
t(18) = 2.859, p=.010)

for Category A. Estimates for

Category B did not systematically differ from the objective
category means.
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1

8. MGans (and standard dGviations) of avGiragG valuGs
GstimatGd by sub j Gets in ExpGrimsnt 3.

Stimulus Conditions
B imoda 1 / Unimoda 1

ObjGCtiVG
ValuGS

Un imoda 1 / Un imoda

A

B

A

B

530.0

421.5

530.0

419.5

(30.0)

(66.1)

(30.0)

(50.0)

522.5

418.6

518.9*

421.6

(16.9)

(32.9)

(19.9)

(30.8)

521.2*

422.7

526.9

432.2

(13.5)

(21.7)

(22.5)

(27.6)

PrGSGntation
conditions
Rapid

Classification

t-tGst of mean GstimatG and objective mean values. *=p<.05.
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An analysis of variance was performed on the means to

ascertain whether there were any differences in the mean
estimates of average values due to either stimulus or

presentation conditions. There were no significant betweensubjects differences, and (as in Experiments

1

and

2)

the

only within-subjects difference was the main effect of

category (A vs.

B)

,

F(l,75) = 702.55, p = 0.000.

Chi-square tests were performed to test whether the
variances of the estimates of the averages were smaller than
the variances of the stimulus distributions. If the variance
of the estimate is smaller than the stimulus distribution

variance, chi-square should also be small. All variances

were significantly less than the stimulus variances, except
for the Category A unimodal/unimodal classification

condition variance, which had a chi-square value of 10.69,
df = 18, p > .05.

F-tests were performed to compare the variances of the

estimates across stimulus and presentation conditions. There
was a significant stimulus condition difference for Category
=
A in the classification presentation condition (F(19,18)

2.77, p<.05). There was also a presentation condition
=
difference in the bimodal/unimodal Category B (F(19,18)

2.29, p<.05.)

In the first case, the variances from the

unimodal/unimodal condition were significantly larger than
is
the variances from the bimodal/unimodal condition, which
57

at odds with the results from Experiment

1

for the same

comparison, and in the second case, the variance of the

rapid presentation Category B group was significantly larger

than the classification group, which is contrary to the
results in Experiment

2

for the same comparison. There do

not appear to be any systematic differences shared by these

three experiments in this analysis, since no observed effect

replicates in another of the experiments.
The series of figures show (Figure

distribution for the unimodal Category

classification subjects' responses,

presentation subjects' responses,

the stimulus

3)

B,

(Figure

(Figure

(Figure

distribution for the bimodal Category

B,

6)

5)

4)

the rapid

the stimulus

(Figure

7)

classification subjects' responses, and (Figure

8)

(See Footnote

1)

presentation subjects' responses.

the

the

the rapid
.

As can

be seen in these figures, subjects' estimates of frequency

suggest that they used a unimodal model to aid in their

representation of the information of the bimodal

distribution information. This is consistent with the
assumption made by the category density model about the use
of a default normal distribution as a model for initial

category representation.
In order to provide a quantitative description of the

figures above, a series of subjects-by-decades analyses on
the linear and quadratic trends of the resulting mean
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.

.

7

Range of Distribution

Figure 3. Stimulus distribution for
Category B unimodal distribution.

Figure 4. Mean frequency estimates for
unimodal Category B from classification
subjects

Figure 5. Mean frequency estimates for
unimodal Category B from rapid presentation
subjects
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Range of Distribution

Figure 6. Stimulus distribution for
Category B bimodal distribution.

Figure 7. Mean frequency estimates for
bimodal Category B from classification
subjects

Range of Distribution

Figure 8. Mean frequency estimates for
bimodal Category B from rapid presentation
subjects
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.

frequency histograms were computed.

In Table

9

it can be

seen that the quadratic trend of the frequency estimates
per

decade of the unimodally distributed as well as the

bimodally distributed stimulus sets were significantly
negative (unimodal classification = -.027, F(l,19) = 4.164,
p < .05, unimodal rapid = -.021, F(l,19) = 56.212, p < .001,

bimodal classification = -.024, F(l,18) = 24.4, p
and bimodal rapid = -.014, F(l,19) = 26.731, p

<

<

.001,

.001)

which

argues that the subject is accessing an underlying

representation that is more like a unimodal symmetric
distribution than a bimodal distribution.

(Neither the cubic

nor the quartic trends differed significantly from zero)
For the unimodally distributed items, this suggests that

subjects have a representation not unlike the one presented.
However, for the bimodally distributed items, the negative

quadratic trend suggests that subjects responded as though
their representation was more similar to that of a unimodal

distribution than

a

bimodal one. This result is fully

consistent with Flannagan et al.

(1986), who suggest that

the subjects' "... initial bias [is] to fit distributions of

exemplars with normal distributions." (p.246).

(It should be

noted that all Category A frequency histograms had

significant negative quadratic trends. They were all
unimodal, though they exhibited the same variability in the
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regularity of the curve that is seen in the Category B
histograms (see figures 4,5,7, and 8)).
It was suggested that subjects should be asked to draw

the distributions of information with which they had been

presented (Raney, personal communication

2)

.

This was done

on an informal basis, to get an idea of how subjects would

go about performing this task. There were two interesting

pieces of information gleaned from this procedure. The first
is that many of our subjects who were asked to draw these

distributions were confused by the request, and were

uncomfortable doing this task. The second interesting point
is that in all but one case (out of 24 subjects,

12 from the

unimodal/unimodal and 12 from the bimodal/unimodal
conditions)

,

subjects trying to illustrate the Category B

distribution drew it as

unimodal distribution.

a

I

do feel

that this would be a potentially fruitful methodology for

assessing subjects' understanding of distributions, but it
would require practice in translating raw information to

graphical representations, a skill which our subjects were
for the most part lacking.

As in Experiment 2,

I

asked subjects either before or

after the frequency estimation task how many items had been

presented in the first phase of the experiment. These data
are reported in the results of Experiment
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2.

Table 9. Subjects by decades trend analyses of frequency
estimates for Experiment 3.

Linear

Quadratic

F

F

Distribution
Presentation
condition
Unimodal/Unimodal
Classification

-0.100

0.478

-0.027

Rapid

-0.034

2.421

-0.021

56.212***

-0.234

.702

-0.024

24.400***

-0.014

26.731***

Bimodal/Unimodal
Classification
Rapid
*

= p<

.05,

0.006
** = p<.01,

8.919**

*** = p<.001.
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4.164*

.

,

Table 10 represents the combined estimates of the
average values across the three experiments, omitting the

retyping groups in Experiment

1.

When an analysis of

variance was performed, there was a significant (and
uninteresting) within-subjects main effect of category,
F( 1,186)

= 1613.63, p = 0.000 which appeared in each

experiment. There was also a significant between-subjects

effect of presentation condition on Category A estimates
(classification = 525.93, rapid = 517.7, F

(

1

,

186) =4 022
.

p=.046). This gives some support to the idea that increased

interaction with the stimulus sets could increase accuracy.
Tests of the difference between estimates of average

values and stimulus means are shown in Table 10. Both

unimodal/unimodal and bimodal/unimodal Category A rapid

presentation average estimates are significantly different
from the objective values (t(48) = 5.299, p = .000, and
t(49)

= 4.479, p = .000 respectively), as is the

classification unimodal/unimodal category A estimate (t(48)
= 2.851, p = .006)

Chi-square tests of the group variances and the

objective variances were performed. All variances of
estimates of average value were significantly smaller than
the objective variances at the .05 level.
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1

.

Table 10. Means (and standard deviations) of average values
estimated by subjects in Experiments 1-3 (combined)

Stimulus Conditions
B imoda 1 / Un imoda

Objective
Values

Un imoda 1/Un imoda

A

B

530.0

421.5

530.0

419.5

(30.0)

(66.1)

(30.0)

(50.0)

519.4**

418.8

515.9**

426.8

(16.7)

(30.3)

(18.6)

(28.7)

524.3*

425.9

527.5

425.4

(14.0)

(32.1)

(17.1)

(28.4)

A

B

Presentation
conditions
Rapid

Classification

t-test of mean estimate and objective mean values.
.

006

,

** = p =

.

000

.

65

*

= p =

.

A series of F-tests were performed comparing
the

variances of the average value estimates. No
significant

differences were observed.
Subjects' estimates of the total number of items was

compared with the sum of their decade frequency estimates.
The mean estimate of number of items was 64.9, with

estimates ranging between 20 and 200. The sum of the
frequency estimates for each subject had a mean of 174, with
sums ranging between 34 and 670. The correlation between

these values across subjects was significant: r(62) =.327,
p
= .001. This caused some surprise, and a plot of the data

showed that a small number

(4)

of extreme scores, was

responsible for the significance of this correlation. When
these subjects' data were withheld, the correlation drops to
r(58)

=.175, p = .10. The lack of a significant correlation

between estimates of frequency and estimates of the number
of items in the stimulus set implies that subjects are not

able to accurately estimate the number of items presented,
at either a discrete level (in terms of the frequency

estimates) or at a gross level (as in the estimates of

N)

.

This in turn suggests that subjects are potentially making

their estimates of frequency based on distributional

information (how many should be there, anchored to their
initial estimate)

instead of specific-item information (how

many were there)
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CHAPTER

5

DISCUSSION

This research was performed to examine two models of

categorization by using distributions of numerical stimuli.
This was done in order to try to understand how subjects may

represent distributions of information in memory. These
models are quite different in their assumptions concerning
what people do with presented information: what is stored,
how it is stored, and what affects the classification of

subsequent information. One of these models, the category
density model (Fried and Holyoak, 1984) assumes that the
subject, upon seeing the information, abstracts a model of

the category, which includes a mean and variance of the

category. This category representation is initially

constrained by an assumption that the information is

distributed unimodally and symmetrically. The model allows
for disconf irming information to alter this default

distribution shape, though this facet of the model is not
examined in the present research.
The other model examined is an exemplar similarity

model (Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1991) which assumes that

presented information is stored veridically as specific-item
information (exemplars)

,

and that this information is used

to make classification decisions, based on its similarity to
67

the to-be-classified item (probe)

.

Similarity is defined as

a function of the distance between the exemplar and the

probe.
In the present research, subjects were presented with

numerical information from two overlapping distributions.
These distributions were either both unimodal and symmetric,
or one of them was bimodal and the other was unimodal,
again, both symmetric. The models tested make different

predictions concerning classification of some items in the
overlap area, as well as different predictions about
subjects' ability to generate reasonably accurate frequency

histograms when asked about the number of items presented
per decade.
The major results obtained in the three experiments are
that:
1)

Subjects' mean estimates of average values of

distributions are often not significantly different from the
means of the presented distributions.
2)

Subjects' mean estimates are significantly less variable

than the presented distributions, suggesting that their

representation is richer than one stored item per category.
3)

The category density model does a better job of

describing classification behavior than does the exemplar
model. When the parameter c is not estimated, the deviations

between the exemplar model predictions and the behavior are
68

.

much higher than the deviations of the category density
model. When c is estimated, the exemplar model deviations

are still higher in three of four groups.
4)

The category density model does a good job of describing

subject classification data, in that Chi-square goodness-offit tests showed that the model was not significantly

different from the subject behavior, while the exemplar
model was in all four groups (with c not estimated) and in
two of four groups (with c estimated)
5)

Subjects' frequency histograms consistently had negative

quadratic trends, describing an inverted

U,

or unimodal

distribution shape, regardless of the characteristics of the
presented information. This is consistent with the category
density model which assumes a default distribution shape

which is unimodal and symmetric. Further, it is inconsistent
with an exemplar model, which would have resulted in
frequency histograms more nearly matching the presented
information.

The results are in line with predictions made by the

category density model, supporting the idea that we abstract
a model of the

distribution of information and use this

model to make classifications. The idea that we abstract
model of a category of information, and maintain an

expectation that that category will be unimodal seems
reasonable from the standpoint of evolutionary
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a

.

considerations. It would allow for the quick, reasonably

accurate representation of the information based on a few
observations. We engineered a bimodal category for these
experiments, but bimodal categories seem artificial (in
fact,

I

cannot come up with one that does not require higher

level category labels to describe it)

,

and it is much more

likely that interaction with such a category would, at least
initially, result in the formation of two unimodal

categories

These results are also consistent with other areas of

psychological theory, especially the ideas of schemas and
script theory. Schemas are cognitive structures which

represent a person's experiences, and which contain general
procedures abstracted from those experiences of the common
features of classes of events. These schemas are used to

apply acquired knowledge about previous events to similar
events, giving the person a framework by which to understand

the event and knowledge about what responses are effective
in events of that sort. As an organizational tool, schemas

are appealing, since they avoid storing redundant

information by storing the abstracted, common features of
classes of events. Script theory, based on the idea of event
schemas (Bower, Black, and Turner, 1979) assumes that we

have procedural models for behavior in common situations

which are connected strings of schemas, and that we tend to
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interpret interactions during these events based
on our
model of how that event should progress. The ideas
of

schemas and scripts are similar to many of the
assumptions
of the category density model: A model is developed
by the

learner which is initially based on an expectation that

category dimensions are distributed unimodally, and which
is
used to aid in making estimates of some distributional
descriptors. This model is then useful in making

classifications of subsequent information based on limited
data.

The unimodal nature of the frequency histograms

generated by the subjects in Experiment

3

is a strong

argument in favor of the category density model. However,
the curves described by the histograms were more variable
and less regular than expected. This was probably due to our

elicitation technique. Subjects were asked for their
estimates in a random order, and were not shown a record of
their previous estimates. If this task were modified to

allow subjects to observe their estimates, either in a list,
or as a developing histogram, we expect that their

histograms would be more regularly unimodal and symmetric.

While the category density model clearly does

a better

job of describing the data, there is also some support for

the exemplar model tested here. For example, there are

values of c for which, in some instances, subject behavior
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,

is not significantly different from the model
predictions.

Further, in Table

3

(page 42)

the observed behavior in the

bimodal/unimodal condition seems to deviate from what would
be expected given a unimodal category representation,
rising
at 500 and 509 to rather high classification proportions.

This could be interpreted as subjects responding to the

bimodal nature of the distribution. However, the evidence
for the category density model is much more compelling.
Thus, the results of this series of experiments do not

necessarily argue against an exemplar model as much as it
argues for our use of default organizational strategies

which mold our exemplar storage abilities. Similar ideas
have been advanced by researchers in areas such as cue-

probability learning (Brehmer 1979)
(Anderson 1985)

Hogarth 1989)

,

,

belief updating

judgment under uncertainty (Einhorn and

,

and category learning (Medin, Altom, and

Murphy 1986), Medin (1990).

The use of exemplars may not be

the central issue here, but whether they are modified to fit
a

predetermined model. Our results make

for subjects' use

(1)

a

strong argument

of a model like the category density

model which is sensitive to the characteristics of the

distributions in question, and

distribution as

a first

(2)

of a default normal

approximation for representing new

category information. However, the results of Experiment

2

suggest that there may be some exemplar information stored
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as well as an abstract model, and it may be that a
hybrid

model which combines these approaches would best approximate

what people do with categorical information.
This apparent conflict in the data could be addressed
by a model which would both store specific-item information

and develop an abstract model of the distribution of the

information encountered. In Experiment

2,

the subjects'

classification behavior did seem to be affected by exemplar
level information as well as the abstracted model of the

stimulus category. This was seen in observed classification

proportions which were higher than they should be, given the
category density model, and which seemed more in line with
the category exemplars. But at the same time, subject

behavior was well described by the category density model. A

combination of these two approaches may go far in describing
what appears to be contradictions in the data. This type of

combination or hybrid model has been discussed before (e.g.
Medin, Altom and Murphy, 1984, Anderson, 1985).

Anderson (1985)

,

for example, suggests that information

about a category is first maintained as specific-item
information, but that this information is combined into an

abstract model in the interests of cognitive economy. New
information, initially being stored as specific-item
information, is compared to this abstraction, and

differences are thus highlighted. This approach would
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.

accentuate how the information was changing over time,
and
just what factors require the allocation of attention.

Development of a model which combined specific and
abstracted information could potentially address some of the
issues which remain unresolved in the study of

categorization
There were several assumptions made concerning the

implementations of the models tested, in estimating c for
the exemplar model, and assuming veridical storage or

estimation abilities. The test of the category density model
was based on the strong assumption that subjects were able
to incorporate into the model veridical estimates of the

means and variances. If the subjects' model were different
from the stimulus distribution, then classification of the

critical items may be the result of some other organizing
tool, and not necessarily the models tested. However, the

results obtained regarding the goodness of fit would argue

against this being the case, and the results of the
subjects' frequency histogram generation still supports the

category density model's assumptions about the subject
engaging in model generation and not accurate exemplar
storage
The exemplar model tested makes the strong assumption
that each item is stored veridically. However, if we forego
this strong assumption, we are left with a model which
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suggests that subjects do not have a rich set of exemplars
by which to make decisions, but rather an impression, or
a

global model of the category, by which they make

classification decisions. This is just the sort of model
that our results support, and which are in line with the

category density model. Subjects are able to make reasonable

estimates of average values, even in this rarified stimulus
situation, and their classification behavior clearly

demonstrates

a

reliance on a model which is in accord with

probability density and not exemplar storage. Further, their
frequency estimation behavior strongly demonstrates that,

whatever the structure of the underlying representation,
subjects use some sort of model which causes these estimates
to be at odds with the presented data, even to the level of

the shape of the distribution, preferring to approximate a

normal distribution instead of a distribution consistent

with the data.

Another assumption made by this instantiation of the
exemplar model was that psychological distance is linearly
related to physical distance. This is not an unreasonable

assumption to make, and it permitted simplifying both
psychological distance

(d;^)

and discriminability

(c)

into

one variable: c. If however, psychological distance is not

linearly related to physical distance, than these results
may be somewhat less compelling, though not disastrously so.
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However, it would be best in continuing this research to

estimate these variables separately, by first developing an
estimate of the function relating physical and psychological
distance, and then using this in the model to make estimates
of c.

There are other experimental limitations with the use
of numerical information as stimuli, predominantly in their

simplicity and their apparent lack of ecological validity.
However, as

I

have discussed earlier,

I

feel that the

benefits clearly outweigh the drawbacks. This simplicity is
a clear

benefit in trying to gain a basic understanding of

what subjects may be doing between perceiving category

information and using that information to make decisions.
The paradigm used here to explore category representation

should be useful in the future in addressing the issues of
how and when subjects engage in updating the distribution

model to more nearly reflect the data, an avenue of research

initiated by Flannagan et al.

(1986).

In this line of

research, however, we need to be aware of the other

psychological issues which affect the encoding and storage
of information, such as attention, motivation, judgment and

decision making, and perception. Each of these areas could
reasonably affect

a

subject's approach to a task like ours,

and each contributes yet another piece of variability to the

picture.

I

find it surprising therefore that the category
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density model fits the subject classification behavior so
well. These results should be generalizable to other

quantitative variables, though the limitations discussed
should be addressed by further research using more complex

categories
There are potentially other types of representations
which would produce the observed data; For example, a model

which stored exemplars, not veridically, but in a weighted
fashion (assign a big weight to items close to the center of
the distribution so that one samples it most often when one

needs to make a classification) could result in similar data
profiles. However, it requires a mechanism by which subjects
'know' what items are close to the center of the

distribution, and so when to apply what amount of weight,

which requires some early item storage and an estimate of
central tendency. This brings us full circle, since it
relies on abstracted distributional information. It may be
(and Flannagan et al. would probably not argue against this

analysis) that these are the sort of memory tools at work in

the present research. We engineered a situation in which the

abstraction of distributional information and these
exemplars were not congruent, due to the bimodality of the
distribution. It seems reasonable to assume that this

abstraction and the exemplars encountered are normally
synchronous. If so, the model would be quite unlikely to
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misadvise the user in her classification behavior, except
in
^J^tificial situations like ours.

What we hoped to gain from this research was an

understanding of the type of information people retain from
experience with unidimensional categories, and how that
information is represented and used to make further

categorization decisions. If one understands how people
treat perceptually and relationally unambiguous, simple
stimuli, then one can use that as a step from which to

consider more complex situations. It should be useful in

understanding non-numerical quantitative stimulus
categorization, since the post-perceptual portion will be
well understood. Also, this should certainly stimulate

research using true (continuous variable) dimensional
stimuli, as opposed to the past focus on stimuli with

binary-valued dimensions, as in Medin and Schaffer,

(1978).

There are several readily apparent directions to
explore from this point. One, mentioned above, is to discern

when and how subjects revise their representations. One way
this could be explored is to use the same paradigm as in

this study, but use extreme versions of the stimuli. For
example,

if one were to superimpose the distributions so

that they share a mean, but one is unimodal and the other is
bimodal, then it should enhance subjects' awareness that the

second distribution is non-unimodal by focussing attention
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on the central part of the distributions. This would also

probably afford a greater range of critical item data
points. It would also probably result in a situation in

which the change in quality of fit of the model to the
behavior could be observed over trials.
The use of a default distribution could also be

examined using a task where the distribution is known. The
category density model assumes the use of a unimodal
symmetric distribution in the absence of other knowledge.
Are other distributions used as defaults if the subject has

foreknowledge of the category being presented? If so, then
this would suggest that this is a flexible heuristic

development tool which is responsive to previously learned
information about a category. It may be that the default
normal is used because we have learned that most category

information is unimodally distributed.
Also, by being able to model what the learner has as a

representation of presented information, the category
density model could be used to examine behavior in areas
such as covariation estimation, or combined with other

process models to further explore decision making behavior
as it departs from normative model expectations.

It may be,

for example, that subjects are behaving in a manner

consistent with normative models (contrary to the literature

concerned with covariation)

,

but that their representations
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are structured based on unimodally distributed
categories in
situations where the distributions are not unimodally

distributed. If subjects' judgments are based on abstracted

models of the information instead of a veridical store of
the information, then this could (would) affect their

understanding of how the distribution of information is
related to other distributions.
The category density model could be compared with

models in the fields of anchoring and adjustment and belief
updating, which tend to be concerned with the incremental

changes in a persons representation of information about an
event. The issue of order effects is central to many

descriptive models of subject behavior in the general field
of judgment and decision making, and information

integration, and this model seems to have some bearing on
this area. But primarily, it should be used to attempt to
fit the large amount of data developed by researchers in

category learning and classification. We have at our
disposal an enormous supply of data, much of which has been

rigorously gathered, which any well-formed model of category
learning and classification should be required to address as
a

part of its evolution as a model of subject behavior.
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Footnote

1

A programming error in Experiment 3 necessitated
running an additional 39 subjects. These subjects are being
treated as a third presentation condition. The problem was
that all subjects received the frequency estimate questions
in exactly the same order. This became evident when looking
at the mean frequency estimates. On the first few trials,
estimates of frequency were grossly inflated, and were
neither representations of the data nor understandable from
the framework supplied by any of the models. It appears that
subjects merely overestimated the first few decades they
confronted. This error was confirmed by several subjects who
noted that they had either ignored the group designation, or
the range early in the task.
There are several ways to address this problem. Our
first measure was to assure ourselves that it was a reliable
order effect by running the additional subjects in a latinsquare ordering in the bimodal/unimodal conditions. We
decided to focus on this group as it was the group of
greatest interest to our design. Most (32 of 39) of these
subjects strongly overestimated the frequency of occurrence
of the first few decades presented, relative to their
subsequent estimates, making estimates of between 10 and 50
items for these first few items, in contrast to 1 to 10
items for the rest of the decades, regardless of their
actual frequency. This is comparable to the performance of
the original subjects. Thus these first few (6) items appear
to be contaminated by order effects, and these items have
been deleted from the subjects' data sets, so as to minimize
the amount of noise in the data due to this order effect.
The first six items for each of the unimodal/unimodal
subjects were also deleted for the same reasons. The mean
frequency estimates for Category B items are shown in
Figures 3 through 8, along with the stimulus distributions.
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Footnote

2

During a discussion of the pilot results for Experiment
it was suggested that we ask subjects to draw the
distributions which had been presented (Raney, personal
communication 2) This was done on an informal basis, to get
an idea of how subjects would go about performing this task.
There were two interesting pieces of information gleaned
from this procedure. The first is that many of our subjects
who were asked to draw these distributions were confused by
3

.

the request, (though exposure to a statistics course seemed
to help) and were uncomfortable doing this task. The second
interesting point is that in all but one case (out of 24
subjects, 12 from the unimodal/unimodal and 12 from the
bimodla/unimodal conditions)
subjects trying to illustrate
the Category B distribution drew it as a unimodal
distribution. I do feel that this would be a potentially
fruitful methodology for looking at subjects understanding
of distributions, but it would require practice in
translating raw information to graphical representations, a
skill which our subjects were for the most part lacking.
,
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS
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Rapid presentation instructions
I want you to imagine that you are a high school
guidance counselor and that you are looking through the
files of a lot of students. Each file you'll see represents
an individual student. Imagine that each student belongs to
one of two social groups. The groups are called PIM and DAP.
As you see the word PIM or DAP appear on the screen, think
of that as a student from that social group. As you see each
PIM or DAP, you will see a three-place number along side the
group name. Think of the number as an SAT score, just like
the score you had to report to the university when you
applied for admission. As a guidance counselor, you want to
get a general idea of which group would have the best chance
of getting into college, and you also want to know what
scores individuals in these groups are getting on their
SAT's, so that you can talk to them about whether each
person is performing up to their capabilities. Look at the
screen and you will see a long series of PIM and DAP files,
one at a time. Presented with each PIM and DAP will be a
number representing the SAT score of that individual. The
files will appear rapidly, and there are a lot of them, so
try as best you can to concentrate on the screen. The files
of the PIM's and DAP's are in a mixed-up order. After you
see the files. I'll ask you some questions about them.
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Retyping presentation instructions
I want you to imagine that you are a high school
guidance counselor and that you are looking through the
files of a lot of students. Each file you'll see represents
an individual student. Imagine that each student belongs to
one of two social groups. The groups are called PIM and DAP.
As you see the word PIM or DAP appear on the screen, think
of that as a student from that social group. As you see each
PIM or DAP, you will see a three-place number along side the
group name. Think of the number as an SAT score, just like
the score you had to report to the university when you
applied for admission. As a guidance counselor, you want to
get a general idea of which group would have the best chance
of getting into college, and you also want to know what
scores individuals in these groups are getting on their
SAT's, so that you can talk to them about whether each
person is performing up to their capabilities. Look at the
screen and you will see a long series of PIM and DAP files,
one at a time. Presented with each PIM and DAP will be a
number representing the SAT score of that individual. As you
see each one, please type it using the keyboard, as if you
were looking at them on paper and entering them into a
database. The files of the PIM's and DAP.s are in a mixed-up
order. After you see the files. I'll ask you some questions
about them.
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Classification presentation instructions
I want you to imagine that you are a high school
guidance counselor and that you are looking through the
files of a lot of students. Each file you'll see represents
an individual student. Imagine that each student belongs to
one of two social groups. The groups are called PIM and DAP.
A series of numbers will appear on the screen one at a time.
Think of the numbers as an SAT score, just like the score
you had to report to the university when you applied for
admission. As a guidance counselor, you want to get a
general idea of which group would have the best chance of
getting into colleges, and you also want to know what scores
individuals in these groups are getting on their SAT's, so
that you can talk to them about whether each person is
performing up to their capabilities. Your task is made more
difficult however by the fact that these files are
constructed so that you must first guess which group an
individual is from based on what you know about them (their
SAT score)
and what you know about the groups (other scores
of people in the groups)
Also, all the files are mixed up.
A number will appear on the screen, and you will be asked
what group the person is from. At first, you'll merely be
guessing, but the computer will show you the correct answer
after you make your best guess, and before long you'll be
able to be pretty accurate. The ranges of the scores of the
groups overlap, so you may have trouble classifying some of
them, but try as best you can. After you see the files. I'll
ask you some questions about them.
,

.
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Subsequent instructions: Experiment

2

We have a number of files from which we have lost the
group labels, so we have no idea from which group the scores
originated. From what you have learned about the scores in
the groups, please do your best to attach the proper labels
to these unlabelled items. These items will be presented to
you one at a time. Please type in what you believe to be the
proper group label for each item. Also, so that we may have
the best luck in correctly assigning these files to their
proper groups, please estimate for each item how confident
you are that that item is from the group to which you
assigned it. Naturally we will weight more heavily an
assignment of group membership which is backed up by a
strong estimate of confidence. Remember to make your
decisions based on the information you have seen about the
groups in question, and not on any preconceived ideas you
may have about either of the groups. And please do not be
concerned about making more assignments to one group than
the other, since we have no information about the total
number of files from each group. There are not any right or
wrong answers; we want your opinions. Please take your time
and make your best reasoned guess about which group the
score in question is from, and estimate how confident you
are that you are right about that guess.
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Subsequent instructions: Experiment

3

We would now like you to think about the
information you have just reviewed about the students scores
who belong to the PIM's and the DAP's. We are curious just
how much information people retain in a task like this, and
how accurately the information is retained. What follows is
a set of questions which will ask you to estimate the number
of scores from a certain group in a specified range. For
example, if you were asked how many PIM's there were between
300 and 309, (including 300 and 309), you would (hopefully)
say;
since there were none.
0
Be as accurate as you can in these estimates. Remember
to make your decisions based on the information you have
seen about the groups in question, and not on any
preconceived ideas you may have about either of the groups.
Take your time and consider each situation individually.
,
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APPENDIX

B:

STIMULUS SETS
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Bimodal/Unimodal Stimulus set
354
561
350
325
499
544
492
333
554
427
506
515
542
524
514
420
366

DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP

552
548
505
578
423
503
383
572
463
522
550
509
542
486
487
517
467

PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM

320
535
513
439
539
416
512
373
474
560
592
511
329
344
520
495
430

DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP

483
336
489
520
495
476
534
400
517
473
341
499
583
456
533
391
507

91

DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM

530
510
546
530
481
564
327
469
356
530
409
361
371
557
529
583

PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM

537
525
492
526
478
502
466
498
498
567
347
519
377
409
448
340

PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP

Unimodal/Unimodal Stimulus set
454
561
450
425
499
544
392
433
554
327
406
515
542
524
414
420
466

DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP

552
548
505
578
523
403
483
572
363
522
550
509
542
386
487
517
467

PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM

420
535
513
339
539
316
412
473
474
560
592
511
429
444
520
395
330

DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP

383
436
389
420
495
476
534
500
517
373
441
399
583
356
533
491
507
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DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
PIM

530
410
546
530
481
564
427
369
456
530
509
461
471
557
529
583

PIM
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
PIM

537
525
492
526
378
502
366
398
498
567
447
419
477
509
348
440

PIM
PIM
PIM
PIM
DAP
PIM
DAP
DAP
PIM
PIM
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP
DAP

.
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